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Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in
Simple Distribution Experiments
By DIRK ENGELMANN AND MARTIN STROBEL*
We present simple one-shot distribution experiments comparing the relative impor-
tance of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion, as well
as the relative performance of the fairness theories by Gary E Bolton and Axel
Ockenfels and by Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt. While the Fehr-Schmidt theory
performs better in a direct comparison, this appears to be due to being in line with
maximin preferences. More importantly, we find that a combination of efficiency
concerns, maximin preferences, and selfishness can rationalize most of the data
while the Bolton-Ockenfels and Fehr-Schmidt theories are unable to explain im-
portant patterns. (JEL D63, D64, C99)
Among the recent attempts to explain behav-
ior observed in economic experiments, models
based on inequality aversion have received spe-
cial attention. The attractiveness of these mod-
els is based on their ability to rationalize a
number of well-known anomalies with just two
motives, selfishness and inequality aversion.
The latter is understood as disutility arising
from differences between one’s own payoff and
others’ payoffs.
The aim of this paper is on the one hand to
compare the relative importance of inequality
aversion, concerns for efficiency, and maximin
preferences1 in simple distribution experiments.
On the other hand, we compare the performance
of the two theories based on inequality aversion
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999, henceforth F&S)
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, henceforth
ERC).
Our first treatments that were designed to
compare ERC and F&S recognized the potential
importance of efficiency and thus controlled for
it. It turned out that efficiency had a major
impact (see treatments F and E in Section III).
This finding inspired further experiments to test
its robustness and to investigate to what extent
inequality aversion is dominated by efficiency
concerns or maximin preferences. In particular,
these treatments allow us to compare the ex-
planatory power of ERC and F&S to the model
by Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin (2002,
henceforth C&R), that is based on efficiency
concerns and maximin preferences and was in-
spired by similar experiments.
Our results suggest that efficiency concerns
and maximin preferences are important in sim-
ple distribution experiments. While this does
not necessarily imply that they are equally im-
portant in other classes of games, common in-
terpretations of several games may well be
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1 Efficiency is here simply understood as the sum of
payoffs, not in the sense of Pareto efficiency. Maximin
preferences are a desire to maximize the minimal payoff in
the group.
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confounded with these motives. This may have
been given too little attention in the past (see
Engelmann and Strobel, 2002, for a discussion).
To illustrate, consider the following example.
First, let person 2 choose only between alloca-
tions A and B among persons 1, 2, and 3.
Allocation A B C
Person 1 9 8 11
Person 2 8 8 10
Person 3 4 8 9
Total 21 24 30
If person 2 is inequality averse she prefers B
over A, but B is also her preferred choice if she
is driven by efficiency concerns or maximin
preferences. Thus deriving any conclusions
from a choice of B concerning the importance
of inequality aversion is confounded by effi-
ciency concerns and maximin preferences. One
cannot tell whether person 2 wants to redistrib-
ute money because she dislikes inequality, cares
for efficiency, or cares particularly for the poor-
est. Now consider the case that person 2 can
choose from A, B, and C. A choice of B now
clearly indicates inequality aversion, since self-
ishness, efficiency concerns, and maximin pref-
erences all suggest a choice of C.
In our experiments, we disentangle efficiency
concerns, maximin preferences, and inequality
aversion to compare their relative importance.
In order to exclude, as far as possible, motives
like reciprocity, we chose degenerate games
like the one above that were completely reduced
to the question of distribution. Since both ERC
and F&S are formulated on the basis of distri-
butions only, these games seem to us the most
neutral playground to compare their predictive
accuracy.
In contrast to previous experiments, in sev-
eral of our treatments ERC and F&S predict
choices of allocations that are at the opposite
ends of the choice set. Here, F&S does better in
general. This, however, appears to result from
F&S being in line with maximin preferences in
this situation. For a complete explanation of our
results, efficiency and maximin preferences are
indispensable.2
In Section I we outline the difference be-
tween ERC and F&S that we focus on. Section
II presents our experimental procedures, and
Section III the experimental results. Section IV
concludes.
I. Inequality Measures in ERC and F&S
The difference between the inequality mea-
sures in ERC and F&S is represented in the
motivation or utility function. The motivation
function of ERC is given by vi(yi, i), with yi
denoting subject i’s own payoff and i subject
i’s share of the total payoff, and vi for given yi
being maximal if i  (1/n), n being the number
of players. F&S assumes a utility function
Ui(x)  xi  i[1/(n  1)] ¥ji max{xj  xi,
0}  i[1/(n  1)] ¥ji max{xi  xj, 0} with
i  i  0, i  1 and xi the payoff of sub-ject i.
Hence ERC assumes that subjects like the
average payoff to be as close as possible to their
own payoff while F&S assumes that subjects
dislike a payoff difference to any other individ-
ual. According to ERC, a subject would thus be
equally happy if all subjects received the same
payoff or if some were rich and some were poor
as long as she received the average payoff, but
according to F&S she would clearly prefer that
all subjects get the same. In a real-life situation
F&S predicts that the middle class would tax the
upper class to subsidize the poor, whereas ERC
does not.
II. Experimental Procedures
We conducted 13 experimental treatments in
three sessions. These sessions were all con-
ducted as classroom experiments at the end of a
lecture during the first weeks of introductory
economics courses at Humboldt-Universita¨t zu
Berlin. One hundred thirty-six participants took
part in the first session in 1998, 240 in the
2 Other fairness theories could be applied to our setting
as well. Our experiments, however, are not suited to test
theories that explicitly take intentions into account (e.g.,
Rabin, 1993; Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher, 2000; Mar-
tin Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger, 2004) since this
would require assumptions about beliefs concerning the
choices of subjects with whom one might be matched. The
same holds for the full C&R model but we can shed some
light on the basic model, relying on selfishness plus quasi-
maximin preferences (maximizing a weighted sum of total
and minimal payoff).
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second session in 2000, and 210 in the third
session in 2001. We had determined a number
of seats corresponding to the desired number of
participants in advance. We asked students to
either take one of these seats or leave the class-
room. Each participant then received a decision
sheet with the instructions and a questionnaire.
We used the questionnaires to gather some bio-
graphical data and to check whether the partic-
ipants understood the task completely. The total
procedure took about 20 minutes. Participants
were paid after the lecture in the following
week. They were identified by a code that was
noted both on the decision sheet and on a de-
tachable identification sheet. They received the
payment in a sealed envelope in exchange for
this sheet. These procedures implied anonymity
with respect to the other participants.
The decision sheet contained three different
allocations of money between three persons, of
which the subjects had to choose one. They
were informed that we would randomly form
groups of three later on and would also assign
the three roles randomly, hence subjects faced
role uncertainty. Only the choice of the partic-
ipant selected as person 2 mattered.3 Two con-
trol treatments assigned fixed roles in advance,
but kept the random ex post formation of
groups. To avoid influence by computation er-
rors we also noted the average payoffs of per-
sons 1 and 3 and the total payoff for each
allocation in the decision sheet. The precise
allocations and the resulting predictions of the
different theories will be presented along with
the results for the individual treatments.4
III. Experimental Results
A. Taxation Games
Details and Predictions: All of the treatments
in this section involve a “middle income” indi-
vidual (person 2) choosing payoffs for a “high
income” individual (person 1) and a “low in-
come” individual (person 3). One can think of
the choices as tax systems corresponding to
different degrees of redistribution. All choices
provide the “middle income” individual with
the same payoff. This is to remove any effects
of selfishness, so we can focus on motives re-
lated to fairness. For all treatments in this sec-
tion, the F&S prediction coincides with the
maximin allocation. This reflects the structure
of this class of taxation problems and is not an
artifact of our design. The crucial property of
these treatments is that the allocation that min-
imizes the difference between the payoffs of
person 2 and each of the other persons, maxi-
mizes the difference between the payoff of per-
son 2 and the average payoff and vice versa.
Thus ERC and F&S predict choices of opposite
allocations.
In one treatment (F), we choose payoffs so
that efficiency coincides with the F&S predic-
tion and the maximin allocation; in another (E),
we choose payoffs so that efficiency coincides
with the ERC prediction. This allows us to
investigate the extent to which efficiency coun-
terbalances the various types of fairness con-
cerns (F&S, ERC, and maximin) and it ensures
that efficiency concerns do not bias the results
in favor of either ERC or F&S.5 We also con-
sider a variation of treatment F, called Fx, and a
variation of treatment E, called Ex, in which the
outcome predicted by ERC involves exactly the
“fair share,” i.e., 1⁄3 , for the “middle income”
individual. The purpose of these treatments is to
make the ERC motive more salient.
The allocations for treatments F, E, Fx, and
Ex are presented in Table 1 (all payoffs are
given in DM, 1 DM corresponded to $0.45 to
$0.55 by the time of the various sessions) along
with the average payoff of persons 1 and 3, the
relative payoff of person 2, and the total pay-
off. We also marked which allocations are pre-
dicted by ERC, F&S, efficiency concerns, and
maximin preferences, as well as the actual
choices.
Each of the treatments E and F was divided
into two subtreatments that only differed by the
order in which the allocations were presented on
3 In other words, we used (a reduced form of) the strat-
egy method. Apart from generating three times the data, it
secured that all participants were considered equally entitled
to the money since all performed the same task.
4 Sample instructions can be found in Engelmann and
Strobel (2002).
5 The preferable way to prevent results from being con-
founded with efficiency would have been that all allocations
yielded the same total payoff. If the decision maker’s own
payoff is fixed, however, ERC implies indifference between
all allocations if the average and thus the total payoff of the
other subjects is the same.
859VOL. 94 NO. 4 ENGELMANN AND STROBEL: SIMPLE DISTRIBUTION EXPERIMENTS
the decision sheet.6 All other treatments were
divided into six subtreatments, one for each
permutation of the allocations.
RESULTS: The results for treatments E and F
(including the subtreatments in the last two
rows) as well as for Fx and Ex are presented in
Table 1. In both treatments F and E there is
virtually no difference between the two sub-
treatments (22  0.08, p  0.96 for treatment E,
and 22  0.16, p  0.92 for treatment F).7 This
consistency suggests that our data are not com-
pletely random.
The results for treatment F are very clear:
83.8 percent of subjects chose the allocation
predicted by F&S, efficiency concerns, and
maximin preferences. The three allocations
were not chosen with equal probability (pABC 
0.001), in particular the F&S allocation was
chosen significantly more often than the ERC
allocation (pAC  0.001).8 For treatment E the
results are more dispersed. Slightly more sub-
jects chose the allocation predicted by ERC and
efficiency than that predicted by F&S and maxi-
min preferences, while 23.5 percent chose the
intermediate allocation.9 The hypotheses that all
three or the two extreme allocations were cho-
sen with equal probability cannot be rejected
(pABC  0.2, pAC  0.8). Since the two treat-
ments balance the influence of efficiency con-
cerns, we also study the pooled data. There,
60.2 percent of subjects chose the allocation
6 This was done to avoid the conceivable influence of a
preference for the center or right allocation. The allocation
with intermediate payoffs was always presented on the left,
since it was the one we were least interested in.
7 Hence we can conclude that the results are not driven
by a preference for either the middle or the right column and
we pool the data from the respective subtreatments. For the
other treatments we do not report results for the subtreat-
ments, since the number of subjects in each of the subtreat-
ments was only five.
8 In the following, pABC will always denote the level of
significance for a multinomial test of the hypothesis that all
allocations are chosen with the same probability, whereas
pXY will denote the level of significance for a (two-sided)
binomial test of the hypothesis that allocations X and Y are
chosen with the same probability taking the number of
choices for the third allocation as given.
9 The explanation that some of these subjects provided in
the questionnaires indicates that they were looking for a
compromise between efficiency and fairness.
TABLE 1—ALLOCATIONS (IN DM), PREDICTIONS BY ERC AND F&S, MAXIMIN AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS, AND DECISIONS
FOR THE TAXATION GAMES
Allocation
Treatment
F E Fx Ex
A B C A B C A B C A B C
Person 1 8.2 8.8 9.4 9.4 8.4 7.4 17 18 19 21 17 13
Person 2 5.6 5.6 5.6 6.4 6.4 6.4 10 10 10 12 12 12
Person 3 4.6 3.6 2.6 2.6 3.2 3.8 9 5 1 3 4 5
Total 18.4 18 17.6 18.4 18 17.6 36 33 30 36 33 30
Average 1, 3 6.4 6.2 6 6 5.8 5.6 13 11.5 10 12 10.5 9
Relative 2 0.304 0.311 0.318 0.348 0.356 0.364 0.278 0.303 0.333 0.333 0.364 0.4
Prediction
Efficiency A A A A
ERC C A C A
F&S A C A C
Maximin A C A C
Choices
Count 57 7 4 27 16 25 26 2 2 12 5 13
Percentage 83.8 10.3 5.9 39.7 23.5 36.7 86.7 6.7 6.7 40 16.7 43.3
Subtreatments
F1 and E1 29 3 2 14 8 12
F2 and E2 28 4 2 13 8 13
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predicted by F&S, whereas 22.8 percent de-
cided in line with ERC (p  0.001, binomial
test).
Of the 136 choices in both treatments, 61.8
percent are in line with the maximization of
total payoffs while 21.3 percent minimize it
(p  0.001, binomial test). Furthermore, the
distribution of decisions clearly differs between
treatments E and F (22  33.07, p  0.001).
Since the crucial difference between E and F is
the role of efficiency, we see this as substantial
evidence that efficiency matters.
The results for treatments Fx and Ex almost
exactly match those for F and E. (Fx: pABC 
0.001, pAC  0.001; Ex: pABC  0.133, pAC 
1; both treatments pooled, ERC vs. F&S allo-
cation: p  0.001, efficiency maximization vs.
minimization: p  0.003; Ex vs. Fx: 22 
12.76, p  0.002.)
In treatments Fx and Ex the ERC prediction
is much more salient than in F and E. Since the
results changed only marginally (distributions
are far from significantly different: 22  0.69,
p  0.7 for Ex vs. E and 22  0.34, p  0.84
for Fx vs. F) and not in favor of ERC, we
conclude that the poor performance of ERC in
our original treatments cannot be attributed to
nonsalient differences in relative payoffs. Argu-
ably, these are still not huge, but if nonsalience
was the issue, then the performance of ERC
should improve at least somewhat compared to
E and F.
Explaining their decisions in treatments E
and F, 17 of the 18 subjects who explicitly
referred to fairness chose according to F&S and
one chose the intermediate allocation. Effi-
ciency concerns were stated by 12 subjects as
the reason for their decision. Only one subject
referred to relative payoffs in the explanation,
but contrary to ERC, this subject stated that he
wanted to maximize his own share. In treat-
ments Ex and Fx all 15 subjects who explicitly
referred to fairness chose the F&S allocation.
Efficiency concerns were mentioned by 16 sub-
jects, and 6 indicated maximin preferences.
Thus among the subjects who explicitly men-
tioned fairness as a motivation, F&S did much
better than ERC and a substantial part of sub-
jects explicitly stated efficiency concerns.
Hence, we conclude for the taxation games
that F&S outperforms ERC and that efficiency
clearly influences choices. Since the F&S pre-
diction is always the maximin allocation, a sub-
stantial part of the data are consistent with
maximin preferences. Furthermore, since most
of the choices which are not in line with maxi-
min preferences are efficient (the ERC alloca-
tion in treatments E and Ex), quasi-maximin
preferences (as in C&R) are consistent with
about 85 percent of the data, if one allows for
heterogeneity of subjects.
B. Envy Games
Details and Predictions: Treatments F and E
demonstrated a major influence of efficiency.
This inspired us to subject both theories of
inequality aversion to a more severe test, in
which they predict decisions that are Pareto-
dominated. This situation is represented by
treatment N, where the payoff to person 2 is
again intermediate and kept constant. In this
treatment F&S predicts a choice of C, which is
Pareto-dominated by the ERC prediction B,
which is in turn Pareto-dominated by allocation
A (see Table 2 which is structured in the same
way as Table 1). We call these games envy
games, because envy could lead the middle
class to take money from the poor, only to be
able to take more from the rich.10
We also used this treatment as a baseline to
test the robustness of our results with regard to
the monetary incentives for person 2. To test
whether subjects were willing to give up own
payoff for their desire to increase efficiency or
to reduce inequality, we let the payoff of person
2 vary across allocations in the treatments Nx,
Ny, and Nyi (see Table 2). Since both F&S and
ERC also take selfishness into account, their
predictions depend on the weight assigned to
selfishness relative to inequality aversion (see
Table 2). The purpose of these treatments is to
test whether our results in the other treatments
might be artifacts of the irrelevance of the
choice for the decision maker’s own payoff, not
to measure precisely the value subjects attach to
either efficiency or equality.
RESULTS: In treatment N, 70 percent chose
the Pareto-efficient allocation (which is consis-
tent with quasi-maximin preferences) and ERC
10 We do not claim that the motivation that leads subjects
to behave in that way is in fact envy, which corresponds to
the -component of F&S. It only seems a likely influence in
this class of games. Hence our choice of name.
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clearly outperforms F&S, but with the aid of
Pareto-dominance (pABC  0.001, pAB  0.025,
pBC  0.04).
In treatment Nx we added 1 DM for person 2
in allocation A and subtracted 1 DM in C. As
expected, this increased the number of choices
of A and decreased that of B (pABC  0.001,
pBC  0.3). In treatment Ny (Nyi), we sub-
tracted 1 DM (0.5 DM) in allocation A and
added 1 DM (0.5 DM) in C. As expected, this
increased the number of choices of C some-
what. However, again the majority chose A,
whereas the choices of B are reduced (Ny:
pABC  0.001, pAB  0.001, pAC  0.001; Nyi:
pABC  0.011, pAB  0.011, pAC  0.044). Thus
the results in these treatments are qualitatively
well in line with the constant-own-payoff treat-
ment N with deviations as expected by standard
economic theory.11 This result suggests that our
results in the other treatments are not plain
artifacts of the constancy of the decision mak-
er’s payoff. There is an (expected) effect of
small variations in the decision maker’s own
payoff, but it is minor.12 Hence the relative
importance of the different motives does not
seem to change fundamentally if selfishness be-
comes an issue.
Note that Ny and Nyi are the only treatments
where F&S makes a unique prediction (C) for
all subjects, including those which are not in-
equality averse, since the decision maker’s own
payoff is maximal and inequality minimal. But
this prediction only covers one-sixth of deci-
sions in both treatments.
We conclude for the envy games that F&S
performs poorly in the face of Pareto-
dominance and that ERC does somewhat better
but not well, whereas the basic C&R model
does very well.13
11 The effect should be larger in treatment Ny than in Nyi
and the number of choices for A should not increase in Ny.
These deviations, however, can be attributed to randomness
in the data, that naturally follows from the random alloca-
tion of the subjects to the treatments. No pair of distribu-
tions is significantly different at 5 percent, 2-test.
12 Note that in Ny 76.7 percent of subjects give up 22
percent of their own payoff, apparently to satisfy quasi-
maximin preferences. While this share corresponds to only a
relatively small absolute payoff, it is often considered strong
evidence against selfishness if subjects are willing to give up
20 or 25 percent of their payoff to achieve, e.g., equality.
13 The envy games also provide an example that the
predictive power of F&S can in some cases substantially be
improved by abstracting from the linear form. If the disutil-
ity is assumed to be, e.g., quadratic in inequality, F&S could
also explain choices of B. In addition, if the restriction  
 is relaxed, then F&S can be consistent with choices of A.
Hence the results can be seen as evidence against some
forms of inequality aversion but not as evidence against all
possible forms of inequality aversion.
TABLE 2—ALLOCATIONS (IN DM), PREDICTIONS BY ERC AND F&S, MAXIMIN AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS, AND DECISIONS
FOR THE ENVY GAMES
Allocation
Treatment
N Nx Ny Nyi
A B C A B C A B C A B C
Person 1 16 13 10 16 13 10 16 13 10 16 13 10
Person 2 8 8 8 9 8 7 7 8 9 7.5 8 8.5
Person 3 5 3 1 5 3 1 5 3 1 5 3 1
Total 29 24 19 30 24 18 28 24 20 28.5 24 19.5
Average 1, 3 10.5 8 5.5 10.5 8 5.5 10.5 8 5.5 10.5 8 5.5
Relative 2 0.276 0.333 0.421 0.3 0.333 0.389 0.25 0.333 0.45 0.263 0.333 0.436
Prediction
Efficiency A A A A
ERC B A or B B or C B or C
F&S C A or C C C
Maximin A A A A
Choices
Count 21 8 1 25 4 1 23 4 3 18 5 7
Percentage 70 26.7 3.3 83.3 13.3 3.3 76.7 13.3 10 60 16.7 23.3
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The envy games emphasize the importance of
efficiency and maximin preferences if they
combine to Pareto-dominance. Even then, how-
ever, they do not capture all choices and thus
there is a potential role for other motives like
inequality aversion.14
In the questionnaires, references to (Pareto)
efficiency are more prominent in treatment Nx
(21 subjects) than in N (11) or Ny and Nyi (15
in total). In all envy games together fewer sub-
jects mention fairness (7) than maximin prefer-
ences (11) and selfishness (13). One subject
states preferences in line with ERC.
C. Rich and Poor Games
Details and Predictions: In the preceding eight
treatments person 2 always obtained an inter-
mediate payoff. Our treatments R and P study
situations where the decision maker receives
either the highest payoff (i.e., is “rich,” treat-
ment R) or the lowest payoff (i.e., is “poor,”
treatment P), which is again constant (see Table
3). Since F&S aggregates over all persons richer
or poorer than oneself, it predicts the same as
ERC in these situations. So these treatments do
not allow us to distinguish between F&S and
ERC. They allow us, however, to contrast effi-
ciency, maximin preferences, and inequality
aversion. In treatment R person 2 can choose for
the other subjects payoffs that are relatively
equal (C) or that are maximal in sum (A). Both
F&S and ERC predict a choice of the efficient
allocation A, whereas maximin preferences pre-
dict C. In contrast, in treatment P inequality
aversion predicts a choice of the least efficient
allocation C. The minimal payoff is constant, so
maximin preferences cannot influence the re-
sults. Hence this treatment allows us to contrast
efficiency and inequality aversion in a frame
neutral to maximin preferences.
At this point we also study our last treatment
Ey. It is identical to Ex except that the alloca-
tor’s payoff is 9 instead of 12. Ey has the basic
structure of the taxation games, but it does not
share the crucial property of the taxation games
that allowed a comparison of F&S and ERC.
14 Our results in treatment N do not necessarily imply
that 30 percent of subjects are inequality averse rather than
motivated by efficiency or maximin. The pattern of ob-
served proportions declining with the efficiency and maxi-
min rank of the allocations well fits a random utility version
of quasi-maximin preferences. Error rates nearly this
high have been estimated from retest reliabilities in two-
alternative lottery choice tasks (see, e.g., T. Parker Ballinger
and Nathaniel T. Wilcox, 1997) and in our treatments the
error rates might be higher since they involve the choice
among three alternatives.
TABLE 3—ALLOCATIONS (IN DM), PREDICTIONS BY ERC AND F&S, MAXIMIN AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS, AND DECISIONS
FOR THE RICH AND POOR GAMES, AS WELL AS FOR TREATMENT EY
Allocation
Treatment
R P Ey
A B C A B C A B C
Person 1 11 8 5 14 11 8 21 17 13
Person 2 12 12 12 4 4 4 9 9 9
Person 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 4 5
Total 25 23 21 23 21 19 33 30 27
Average 1, 3 6.5 5.5 4.5 9.5 8.5 7.5 12 10.5 9
Relative 2 0.48 0.522 0.571 0.174 0.19 0.211 0.273 0.3 0.333
Prediction
Efficiency A A A
ERC A C C
F&S A C C
Maximin C A or B or C C
Choices
Count 8 6 16 18 2 10 12 7 11
Percentage 26.7 20 53.3 60 6.7 33.3 40 23.3 36.7
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The ERC prediction is shifted from A to C. Not
only ERC and F&S, but also maximin and
hence all fairness motives under consideration
predict the choice of the least efficient alloca-
tion. Therefore, this treatment serves the same
purpose as the poor game, namely the com-
parison of efficiency concerns and fairness
motives.
RESULTS: In treatment R where both ERC
and F&S predict the efficient allocation A, only
26.7 percent of the choices were in accordance,
whereas 53.3 percent of the subjects chose C
(pABC  0.08, pAC  0.15). In contrast, in
treatment P, where both ERC and F&S predict
allocation C, 60 percent chose the efficient al-
location A (pABC  0.001, pAC  0.18), i.e., far
more subjects chose the efficient allocation
when it is not minimizing inequality compared
to the case when it does (p  0.08). The distri-
bution of choices differs significantly between
R and P (22  7.23, p  0.03).
The comparison indicates that maximin pref-
erences are important. In R the minimal payoff
is maximized in allocation C,15 which was cho-
sen by the majority of subjects, whereas in P the
minimal payoff is constant, so maximin prefer-
ences have no influence.
The results of treatment Ey show roughly a
tie between the efficient allocation A (40 per-
cent) and the least efficient, but supposedly fair
allocation C (36.7 percent). These results are
well in line with treatment P, since the lower
number of efficient choices and the marginally
higher number of choices for C are consistent
with a positive influence of maximin prefer-
ences.16 The fundamental difference between
the treatments Ey and Ex is the ERC prediction.
The results are essentially identical (even mar-
ginally against ERC), which indicates that ERC
is irrelevant in this context.
Treatments Ey and P provide evidence
against a primary importance of inequality aver-
sion in general form, not just the specific for-
mulations of F&S and ERC. According to the
axiomatic characterization of F&S provided by
William S. Neilson (2002), a choice of C in
treatment R only contradicts a combination of
inequality aversion and linearity.17 A choice of
A in treatments N, Ny, and Nyi contradicts a
combination of inequality aversion and posi-
tional asymmetry (which is reflected by the
condition   ). In contrast, in treatments P
and Ey, a choice of A is inconsistent with the
inequality aversion property alone18 as well as
with non-self-centered inequality aversion and
ERC. In both treatments fewer subjects chose
the allocation predicted by all versions of in-
equality aversion than the efficient allocation,
although the former is also consistent with com-
petitiveness and in Ey even with maximin pref-
erences, motives that appear to be of substantial
importance.19
Treatment P also shows the limits of quasi-
maximin preferences, since for any positive
weight on efficiency quasi-maximin preferences
imply a choice of A, chosen by only 60 percent
of the subjects. A third of the subjects instead
seems to be guided by either inequality aversion
or by competitiveness.
It is conceivable that the role uncertainty that
subjects faced in the preceding treatments might
have enhanced their concerns for efficiency.
They were clearly confronted with the possibil-
ity to end up in any of the three roles and this
might have increased their concern for the well-
being of the subjects in the other roles. It also
might have increased in particular the concern
for the subject with the lowest payoff and hence
15 Nine of ten subjects who mentioned fairness chose C,
only two subjects explicitly indicated maximin preferences.
16 From this comparison, though, this influence seems
rather weak. Furthermore, maximin does worse in compar-
ison to efficiency than in treatment R (distributions are,
however, far from significantly different, 22  1.8, p 
0.4). A possible explanation is that the trade-off between
efficiency and the minimal payoff is more favorable to
maximin in R than in Ey. Thus the difference is consis-
tent with reasonable parameter distributions in the C&R
model.
17 A choice of C would, however, only be consistent with
unrealistically extreme forms of inequality aversion that
have absurd implications. Even if the disutility was cubic in
the payoff difference, B would still be preferred over C.
18 The results in P would be consistent with inequality
aversion if the utility function was highly convex in the
inequality, but this property is just the opposite of what is
necessary to reconcile results in R and the basic dictator
game with inequality aversion. Choices for A in Ey are even
inconsistent with this form of inequality aversion.
19 Charness and Brit Grosskopf (2001) also study pure
distribution experiments and they find that about 10 percent
of choices can clearly be attributed to competitive prefer-
ences. Falk et al. (2000a) find even 19 percent competitive
subjects.
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increased the role of maximin preferences.20
We have conducted control treatments for Ex
and P (with 90 subjects each), where subjects
knew their role in advance. Only subjects in the
role of person 2 were asked to choose an allo-
cation and they knew that their choice would be
implemented.21 Treatment P allows us to study
the isolated effect on efficiency, treatment Ex
possible effects on both efficiency and maximin
preferences.
The control treatments do not provide any
indication that our results are primarily driven
by the role uncertainty method. In both treat-
ments without role uncertainty the number of
choices for the efficient allocation decreases by
one-sixth (see Engelmann and Strobel, 2002,
for the detailed results). This is in line with the
hypothesis that role uncertainty favors effi-
ciency, but the differences are small and far
from significant (Ex: 22  1.22, p  0.54, P: 22
 0.65, p  0.72). There is also no indication
that the role uncertainty increased the focus on
maximin preferences (if anything, the data point
in the opposite direction). Charness and Rabin
(2001) conducted control treatments for 11
games to test whether the role reversal they
employed in Charness and Rabin (2002) affects
behavior. They do not find significant or sub-
stantial effects either.
D. The Relative Importance of the Different
Motives
In order to better understand the relative in-
fluences of the different motives we pool the
data and estimate a conditional logit model (our
situation is captured by McFadden’s choice
model, see, e.g., G. S. Maddala, 1983).
For each allocation j  {A, B, C} that person
i can choose we define the following explana-
tory variables, with xjk the payoff to person k in
allocation j:
Effij  
k1
3
xjk ,
MMij  minxjk , k 1, 2, 3,
Selfij  xj2,
FSij 
1
2 
k2
maxxjk  xj2 , 0,
FSij 
1
2 
k2
maxxj2  xjk , 0,
ERCij 10013
xj2
Effij, and let
Vij  	1Effij 
 	2MMij 
 	3Selfij
 	4FSij 
 	5FSij 
 	6ERCij .
Then according to the conditional logit model
the probability that person i chooses allocation j
is given by
Pij 
exp	Vij

¥
g A,B,C
exp	Vig

.
Since we only have one decision per subject, we
cannot take into account any individual differ-
ences. Hence with this approach we estimate the
preferences of an “average subject” and all het-
erogeneity is incorporated in the error.
Considering the  and  components of F&S
separately allows us to investigate for both com-
ponents individually whether they explain any
of the variance. This, however, causes a col-
linearity problem because in all of our treat-
ments FS  FS  1⁄2 Eff  3⁄2 Self. To
overcome this problem, in a first approach we
exclude Self, because we are not primarily in-
terested in the role of self-interest. In a second
approach, we include a strict version of F&S,
FSstrict  FS  FS, replacing the separate
components by an aggregate measure of in-
equality that assumes equal weights assigned to
disadvantageous and advantageous inequality.
20 On the other hand, the role uncertainty could also
enhance the role of inequality aversion since this method
underlines that all players are a priori in the same situation,
so that no one deserves more or less than the others.
21 The subjects who were assigned the roles of person 1
or 3 were asked how they would have chosen if they had
been in the role of person 2 and what choice they expected
person 2 to make. Neither the distribution of the hypothet-
ical choices nor of the expectations differs significantly
from the distribution of actual choices for any group of
subjects or treatment (22  3.1, p  0.21 for all pairwise
comparisons).
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We also conducted another run excluding MM.
The results are reported in Table 4 along with
the results of likelihood ratio tests of hypothe-
ses that certain subsets of the motives are
irrelevant.22
If we include both components of F&S sep-
arately, we find that efficiency and especially
maximin preferences have a clear significant
influence. In contrast, neither component of
F&S has significant impact, with the  compo-
nent having a positive impact and the  com-
ponent a negative. Hence the motivation to
increase poorer subjects’ payoffs is entirely cap-
tured by the maximin motive. The ERC motive
has a negative, marginally significant impact.
Likelihood ratio tests reveal that both F&S com-
ponents together do not explain additional vari-
ance (p  0.3) and that F&S and ERC jointly
add only marginally to the explanation (p 
0.1). Including FSstrict and Self instead of the
separate F&S components yields qualitatively
the same results.
Excluding the maximin motive provides an
important insight. We now find a highly signif-
icant positive effect of FSstrict and a highly
significant negative impact of the ERC motive.
This means that if we ignore the maximin mo-
tive, F&S appears to be a much better model of
distributional preferences than ERC. This pro-
vides a deeper understanding of why F&S
clearly outperforms ERC in the taxation games,
but does poorly in the other games. The superior
performance of F&S in the taxation games
seems to result from being in line with maximin
there, but not from being a more accurate model
of behavior in general.23
IV. Conclusion
Bolton (1998) suggests three building blocks
to explain behavior in games: motivation, learn-
ing, and strategic reasoning. In the present
experiments we have completely isolated distri-
butional preferences from issues such as learn-
ing, intentions, and strategic reasoning, because
distributions are given the central role in F&S
and ERC. We are thus able to provide a pure
test both for the comparison of ERC and F&S
and for the relative importance of inequality
aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences
as components of the motivation block. It turns
out that inequality aversion does not seem to be
a major part in a complete explanation in this
setting. F&S and ERC are unable to explain
important patterns in our data. In contrast, a
combination of efficiency concerns, maximin
preferences, and selfishness (which amounts to
the basic C&R model) can rationalize most of
the data. The conditional logit analysis of the
pooled data shows that the basic C&R model is
virtually sufficient to explain the data. While
F&S and ERC do not account for additional
variance, both efficiency and maximin do. This
is consistent with results for similar simple dis-
tribution games in Charness and Grosskopf
22 The odds ratio denotes the factor by which the odds
[Pij/(1  Pij)] are multiplied if the corresponding indepen-
dent variable increases by one unit. Choosing the negative
of the inequality as measured by F&S and ERC as explan-
atory variables implies that estimating an odds ratio 1
amounts to an influence in line with F&S or ERC. Note that
the odds ratios for different explanatory variables are in
general not directly comparable because the variables are
partly scaled in different ways.
23 All results reported in this section are robust to the
exclusion of treatments E, F, and Ey (see Engelmann and
Strobel, 2002, for details and the motivation for excluding
these treatments). We excluded the control treatments for
Ex and P from the analysis because they were run with a
different procedure.
TABLE 4—ESTIMATED ODDS RATIOS FOR THE CONDITIONAL
LOGIT MODEL AND RESULTS OF LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS
Odds ratio
Significance
(p-value)
	1 (Eff) 1.232 0.012
	2 (MM) 1.492 0.001
	4 (FS) 1.245 0.161
	5 (FS) 0.816 0.286
	6 (ERC) 0.953 0.078
L-R 	4  	5  0 0.315
L-R 	4  	5  	6  0 0.109
	1 (Eff) 1.109 0.026
	2 (MM) 1.492 0.001
	3 (SELF) 1.373 0.150
	4 (FSstrict) 1.007 0.937
	6 (ERC) 0.953 0.078
L-R 	4  	6  0 0.157
	1 (Eff) 1.286 0.001
	3 (SELF) 1.032 0.862
	4 (FSstrict) 1.351 0.001
	6 (ERC) 0.898 0.001
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(2001), Alexander Kritikos and Friedel Bolle
(2001), and Charness and Rabin (2002).24
The superior performance of F&S over ERC
in the taxation games, which we consider the
most neutral playground for the comparison of
F&S and ERC, appears to be driven by the fact
that F&S is in line with maximin preferences.
Hence the results cannot be interpreted in a way
that more subjects have F&S preferences than
ERC preferences but that F&S takes into ac-
count that subjects (other things being equal)
care about the minimal payoff in the group. It
appears a limitation of ERC that it does not
do so.
A further deficiency of both F&S and ERC is
that they do not explicitly consider intentions (a
matter that we deliberately designed out of our
experiments), as is demonstrated by the exper-
iments of, e.g., Sally Blount (1995), Falk et al.
(2000a, b), and John H. Kagel and Katherine
Willey Wolfe (2001).
The degenerate games we study are certainly
of a special kind. Hence at the current stage, our
results do not discard inequality aversion as a
motive in general. Both F&S and ERC are,
however, exclusively formulated on the basis of
distributions and interaction and intentions
should rather appear as confounding factors.
We conclude that theories that are based on
distributions should, in general, carefully clarify
under which conditions they are appropriate.
Inequality aversion may do better in situations
involving perceived intentions, because in these
games reciprocity may coincide with inequality
aversion and hence the latter may serve as a
black box model of the former, as Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) suggest. This, however, may be
an artifact of the classes of games that have
been the focus of experimental research so far
(in particular those where a player who treats
another player unfairly has a higher payoff, as
in the ultimatum game).25
Our games can be considered special in
three respects. First, in most treatments the
allocator’s payoff is not affected. Second, there
is role uncertainty. Third, there is no strategic
interaction.
Concerning the first two issues, our treat-
ments Nx, Ny, and Nyi as well as the control
treatments for Ex and P provide no indication
that the absence of monetary incentives or the
role uncertainty substantially change the rela-
tive importance of inequality aversion, effi-
ciency, and maximin preferences. Therefore, we
can at least clearly refute the claim that our
results are entirely driven by these factors.
While large incentives would most likely
change subjects’ decisions, we see no obvious
reason why they should change the relative im-
portance of the different motives.
The remaining issue is the absence of strate-
gic interaction in our experiments. It is conceiv-
able that apart from the influence of reciprocity,
strategic interaction alone might change the im-
portance of different distributional motives. It is
difficult to disentangle this potential effect from
effects of perceived intentions and to the best of
our knowledge there is yet no persuasive evi-
dence on this matter.26 It is an issue of substan-
tial importance. If the relative importance of
different distributional preferences depends on
the presence and the nature of the strategic
interaction, then the whole approach to test dis-
tributional preferences in one strategic situa-
tion, to understand the results in another,
appears to be problematic. There are, how-
ever, also important situations, which may
well not be perceived as strategic interaction,
and for these our results are thus more di-
rectly applicable. An example would be vot-
ing in large groups.
As long as there is no conclusive evidence
that the relevance of our results is entirely con-
fined to noninteractive situations, they also have
some general implications. In interpreting ex-
perimental results one should keep efficiency
concerns and maximin preferences in mind as
alternative explanations. They are consistent
24 Our results are also consistent with the purely distri-
butional model by James C. Cox et al. (2002). A similar
model is studied by James Andreoni and John H. Miller
(2002) and they show that it fits the data of dictator games
well.
25 Inequality aversion might also be more important
when perfect equality is an option. Werner Gu¨th et al.
(2001) show that in mini-ultimatum games the availability
of only nearly instead of perfectly equal allocations sub-
stantially increases the rate of unfair proposals and reduces
rejection rates.
26 Evidence on this issue so far indicates primarily that
subjects become more selfish when part of the responsibility
for the outcome can be attributed to the other subject
(Bolton and Rami Zwick, 1995, and Charness and Rabin,
2001, who call this “complicity effect”).
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with many results that are readily interpreted as
evidence for other motives.27 For example, in
the investment game (Joyce E. Berg et al.,
1995) sending money by the first mover appears
to reflect trust, but as shown by Cox (2004) in a
comparison with dictator control experiments,
to a large part it can be attributed to efficiency
concerns. Similarly, a positive relation between
the amount sent and the amount returned by the
second mover suggests reciprocity or inequality
aversion, but might as well be driven by maxi-
min preferences.28
Deviations from pure selfishness have been
interpreted that subjects are better people (i.e.,
more altruistic or fair), but maybe they are just
better economists. It is surprising that for econ-
omists the goal in designing economic institu-
tions is to maximize efficiency, while as
experimentalists, when designing economic ex-
periments, they tend to ignore that subjects
might share this goal.
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